Abstract-Non-malleable codes, defined by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS '10), provide roughly the following guarantee: if a codeword c encoding some message x is tampered to c = f (c) such that c = c, then the tampered message x contained in c reveals no information about x. The nonmalleable codes have applications to immunizing cryptosystems against tampering attacks and related-key attacks. One cannot have an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all efficient tampering functions f . However, in this paper we show "the next best thing": for any polynomial bound s given a-priori, there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all tampering functions f computable by a circuit of size s. More generally, for any family of tampering functions F of size |F | ≤ 2 s , there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all f ∈ F . The rate of our codes, defined as the ratio of message to codeword size, approaches 1. Our results are information-theoretic and our main proof technique relies on a careful probabilistic method argument using limited independence. As a result, we get an efficiently samplable family of efficient codes, such that a random member of the family is non-malleable with overwhelming probability. Alternatively, we can view the result as providing an efficient non-malleable code in the "common reference string" model. We also introduce a new notion of non-malleable key derivation, which uses randomness x to derive a secret key y = h(x) in such a way that, even if x is tampered to a different value x = f (x), the derived key y = h(x ) does not reveal any information about y. Our results for non-malleable key derivation are analogous to those for non-malleable codes. As a useful tool in our analysis, we rely on the notion of "leakage-resilient storage" of Davì, Dziembowski, and Venturi (SCN '10), and, as a result of independent interest, we also significantly improve on the parameters of such schemes.
particularly attractive as a mechanism for protecting memory against tampering attacks, known to be a serious threat for the security of cryptographic schemes [4] [5] [6] [7] . As shown in [1] , to protect a scheme with some secret state against memorytampering, we simply encode the state via a non-malleable code and store the encoding in the memory instead of the original secret. One can show that if the code is non-malleable with respect to function family F , the transformed system is secure against tampering attacks carried out by any function in F . See [1] , [8] and [9] for a discussion of the application of non-malleable codes to tamper resilience.
Non-malleable codes also find applications to nonmalleable cryptography, in particular for constructing nonmalleable public-key encryption [10] [11] [12] and commitment schemes [13] , [14] .
Limitations & Possibility: It is impossible to have codes that are non-malleable for all possible tampering functions. For any coding scheme (Enc, Dec), there exists a tampering function f bad (c) that recovers x = Dec(c), creates x by, e.g., flipping the first bit of x, and outputs a valid encoding c of x . Notice that if Enc, Dec are efficient, then the function f bad is efficient as well. Thus, it is also impossible to have an efficient code which is non-malleable w.r.t. all efficient functions. Prior works (see Section II) constructed non-malleable codes for several rich and interesting function families. In all cases, the families are restricted through their granularity rather than their computational complexity. In particular, these works envision that the codeword is split into several (possibly just 2) components, each of which can only be tampered independently of the others. The tampering function therefore only operates on a "granular" rather than "global" view of the codeword.
A. Our Contribution
In this work, we are interested in designing non-malleable codes for large families of functions which are only restricted by their "computational complexity" rather than "granularity". As we saw, we cannot have a single efficient code that is nonmalleable for all efficient tampering functions. However, we show the following positive result, which we view as the "next best thing":
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem, Informal): For any polynomial bound s = s(n) in the codeword size n, and any tampering family F of size |F | ≤ 2 s , there is an efficient code of complexity poly(s, log(1/ε)) which is ε-non-malleable w.r.t. F . In particular, F can be the family of all circuits of size at most s.
The code is secure in the information theoretic setting, and achieves optimal rate (message/codeword size) arbitrarily close to 1. It has a simple construction relying only on t-wise independent hashing.
1) The CRS Model: In more detail, if we fix some family F of tampering functions (e.g., circuits of bounded size), our result gives us a family of efficient codes, such that, with overwhelming probability, a random member of the family is non-malleable w.r.t. F . Each code in the family is indexed by some hash function h from a t-wise independent family of hash functions H. This result already shows the existence of efficient non-malleable codes with some small non-uniform advice to indicate a "good" hash function h.
However, we can also efficiently sample a random member of the code family by sampling a random hash function h. Therefore, we find it most appealing to think of this result as providing a uniformly efficient construction of non-malleable codes in the "common reference string" (CRS) model, where a random public string consisting of the hash function h is selected once and fixes the non-malleable code. We emphasize that, although the family F (e.g., circuits of bounded size) is fixed prior to the choice of the CRS, the attacker can choose the tampering function f ∈ F (e.g., a particular small circuit) adaptively depending on the choice of h.
We argue that it is unlikely that we can completely de-randomize our construction and come up with a fixed uniformly-efficient code which is non-malleable for all circuits of size (say) s = O(n 2 ). In particular, this would require a circuit lower bound, showing that the function f bad (described above) cannot be computed by a circuit of size O(n 2 ).
2) Non-Malleable Key-Derivation: As an additional contribution, we introduce a new primitive called non-malleable key derivation. Intuitively, a function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k is a non-malleable key derivation for tampering family F if it guarantees that for any tampering function f ∈ F , if we sample uniform randomness x ← {0, 1} n , the "derived key" y = h(x) is statistically close to uniform even given y = h( f (x)) derived from "tampered" randomness f (x) = x. Our positive results for non-malleable key derivation are analogous to those for non-malleable codes. One difference is that the rate k/n is now at most 1/2 rather than 1, and we show that this is optimal.
While we believe that non-malleable key derivation is an interesting notion on its own (e.g., it can be viewed as a dual version of non-malleable extractors [15] ), we also show it has useful applications for tamper resilience. For instance, consider some cryptographic scheme G using a uniform key y ← {0, 1} k . To protect G against tampering attacks, we can store a bigger key x ← {0, 1} n on the device and temporarily derive y = h(x) each time we want to execute G.
In the appendix, we show that this approach protects any cryptographic scheme with a uniform key against onetime tampering attacks. The main advantage of using a nonmalleable key-derivation rather than non-malleable codes is that the key x stored in memory is simply a uniformly random string with no particular structure (in contrast, the codeword in a non-malleable code requires structure).
In Section VII, we also show how to use non-malleable key derivation to build a tamper-resilient stream cipher. Our construction is based on a pseudorandom generator (PRG) prg : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n+v and a non-malleable key derivation function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k . For an initial key s 0 ← {0, 1} n , sampled uniformly at random, the output of the stream cipher at each round
B. Our Techniques 1) Non-Malleable Codes:
Our construction of nonmalleable codes is incredibly simple and relies on t-wise independent hashing, where t is proportional to s = log |F |.
In particular, if h 1 , h 2 are two such hash functions, we encode a message x into a codeword c = (r, z, σ ) where r is randomness, z = x ⊕ h 1 (r ) and σ = h 2 (r, z). The security analysis, on the other hand, requires two independently interesting components. Firstly, we rely on the notion of leakage-resilient encodings, proposed by Davì et al. [16] . These provide a method to encode a secret in such a way that a limited form of leakage on the encoding does not reveal anything about the secret. One of our contributions is to significantly improve the parameters of the construction from [16] by using a fresh and more careful analysis, which gives us such schemes with an essentially optimal rate. Secondly, we analyze a simpler/weaker notion of bounded non-malleability, which intuitively guarantees that an adversary seeing the decoding of a tampered codeword can learn only a bounded amount of information on the encoded value. This notion of bounded non-malleability is significantly simpler to analyze than full non-malleability. Finally, we show how to carefully combine leakage-resilient encodings with bounded non-malleability to get our full construction of non-malleable codes. On a very high (and not entirely precise) level, we can think of h 1 above as providing "leakage resilience" and h 2 as providing "bounded non-malleability".
We stress that the fact that t has to be proportional to s is not an artefact of our proof. In fact, one can see that whenever the hash function has seed size s, there is a family of 2 s functions that breaks the construction with probability 1: For each seed, just have a new function that decodes with that seed and encodes a related value. This shows that the t has to be proportional to log |F |.
2) Non-Malleable Key-Derivation: Our construction of nonmalleable key-derivation functions is even simpler: a random t-wise independent hash function h already satisfies the definition with overwhelming probability, where t is proportional to s = log |F |. The analysis is again subtle and relies on a careful probabilistic method argument. Similar to the case of non-malleable codes, the fact that t has to be proportional to s is necessary.
II. RELATED WORKS

A. Granular Tampering
Most of the earlier works on non-malleable codes focus on granular tampering models, where the tampering functions are restricted to act on individual components of the codeword independently. The original work of [1] (see also [10] ) gives an efficient construction for bit-tampering (i.e., the adversary can tamper with each bit of the codeword independently of every other bit). Very recently, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [17] gave a construction with improved rate and better efficiency for the same family. Choi et al. [18] considered an extended tampering family, where the tampering function can be applied to a small (logarithmic in the security parameter) number of blocks independently, while Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [19] achieved a construction for the case of a constant number of states that can be tampered independently.
Perhaps the least granular and most general such model is the so-called split-state model, where the encoding consists of two parts L (left) and R (right), and the adversary can tamper L and R arbitrarily but independently. Starting with the random oracle construction of [1] , a few other constructions of non-malleable split-state codes have been proposed, both in the computational setting [8] , [20] [21] [22] and in the information theoretic setting [17] , [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . Notice that the family F split of all split-state tampering functions (without restricting efficiency), has doubly exponential size 2 O(2 n/2 ) in the codeword size n, and therefore it is not covered by our results, which can efficiently handle at most singly-exponential-size families 2 poly(n) . On the other hand, the split-state model does not cover "computationally simple" functions, such as the bit-wise inner-product of L, R. Therefore, although the two lines of work are technically orthogonal, we believe that looking at computational complexity may be more natural.
B. Global Tampering
The work of [1] gives an existential (inefficient) construction of non-malleable codes for doubly-exponential sized function families. More precisely, for any constant 0 < α < 1 and any family F of functions of size |F | ≤ 2 2 αn in the codeword size n, there exists an inefficient non-malleable code w.r.t. F ; indeed a completely random function gives such a code with high probability. The code is clearly not efficient, and this should be expected for such a broad result: the families F can include all circuits of size (e.g.,) s(n) = 2 n/2 , which means that the efficiency of the code must exceed O(2 n/2 ). Unfortunately, there is no direct way to "scale down" the result in [1] so as to get an efficient construction for singly-exponential-size families. (One can view our work as providing such "scaled down" result.) Moreover, the analysis only yielded a rate of at most (1 − α)/3 < 1/3, and it was previously not known if such codes can achieve a rate close to 1, even for "small" function families. We note that [1] also showed that the probabilistic method construction can yield efficient non-malleable codes for large function families in the random oracle model. However, this only considers function families that do not have access to the random oracle. For example, one cannot interpret this as giving any meaningful result for tampering functions with bounded complexity.
Subsequent to the conference version of our work [28] , non-malleable codes have been constructed for other global tampering families including functions with few fixed points and high entropy [29] , permutations [30] , [31] , and circuits of bounded depth and bounded fan-in [32] .
C. Concurrent and Independent Work
In a concurrent and independent work, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [33] , [34] give two related results. Firstly, they improve the probabilistic method construction of [1] and show that, for families F of size |F | ≤ 2 2 αn , there exist (inherently inefficient) non-malleable codes with rate 1 − α, which they also show to be optimal. This gives the first characterization of the rate of non-malleable codes. Secondly, similar to our results, they use limited independence to construct efficient non-malleable codes when restricted to tampering families F of size |F | ≤ 2 s(n) for a polynomial s(n).
However, the construction of [33] and CheraghchiG16 is not "efficient" in the usual cryptographic sense: to get errorprobability ε, the encoding and decoding procedures require complexity poly(1/ε). If we set ε to be negligible, as usually desired in cryptography, then the encoding/decoding procedures would require super-polynomial time. In contrast, the encoding/decoding procedures in our construction have efficiency poly(log(1/ε)), and therefore we can set ε to be negligible while maintaining polynomial-time encoding/decoding.
D. Other Approaches to Achieve Tamper Resilience
There is a vast body of literature that considers tampering attacks using other approaches besides non-malleable codes [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] . The reader is referred to, e.g., [1] for a more detailed comparison between these approaches and nonmalleable codes.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote the set of first n natural numbers, i.e. {1, . . . , n}, by [n] . Let X, Y be random variables with supports S(X), S(Y ), respectively. The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as
We write X ≈ ε Y and say that X and Y are ε-statistically close to denote that SD(X, Y ) ≤ ε. We let U n denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . We use the notation x ← X to denote the process of sampling a value x according to the distribution X. If f is a randomized algorithm, we write f (x; r ) to denote the execution of f on input x with random coins r . We often write f (x) for the random variable f (x; U ), with U uniform over the set of all random coins for the function. We recall two lemmas from [48] . Notice that Lemma 2 is slightly modified from Lemma A.1 of [48] , where the random variables are fully independent. However it is easy to extend the statement in [48] to the one above by a simple observation (also stated in [48] ) that, by linearity of expectation, the value of E[(X − μ) t ] can be computed under the assumption that X 1 , . . . , X n are fully independent, whenever they are at least t-wise independent.
B. Definitions of Non-Malleable Codes
Definition 1 (Coding Scheme): A (k, n)-coding scheme consists of two functions: a randomized encoding function Enc : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n , and a deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k ∪ {⊥} such that, for each
We now define non-malleability w.r.t. some family F of tampering functions. The work of [1] defines a default and a strong version of non-malleability. The main difference is that, in the default version, the tampered codeword c = c may still encode the original message x whereas the strong version ensures that any change to the codeword completely destroys the original message. We only define the strong version below. We then add an additional strengthening which we call super non-malleability.
Definition 2 (Strong Non-Malleability [1] ): Let (Enc, Dec) be a (k, n)-coding scheme and F be a family of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We say that the scheme is (F , ε)-nonmalleable if for any x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and any f ∈ F , we have Tamper
where
Output same if c = c, and x otherwise.
⎫ ⎬ ⎭ .
For super non-malleable security (defined below), if the tampering manages to modify c to c such that c = c and Dec(c ) = ⊥, then we will even give the attacker the tampered codeword c in full rather than just giving x = Dec(c ). We do not immediately see a concrete application of this strengthening, but it seems sufficiently interesting to define explicitly.
Definition 3 (Super Non-Malleability): Let (Enc, Dec) be a (k, n)-coding scheme and F be a family of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We say that the scheme is (F , ε)-super non-malleable if for any x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and any f ∈ F , we have Tamper
where:
and else output c .
IV. IMPROVED LEAKAGE-RESILIENT CODES
We will rely on leakage resilience as an important tool in our analysis. The following notion of leakage-resilient codes was defined by [16] . Informally, a code is leakage-resilient w.r.t. some leakage family F if, for any f ∈ F , "leaking" f (c) for a codeword c does not reveal anything about the encoded value.
Definition 4 (Leakage-Resilient Codes [16] ):
The work of [16] gave a probabilistic method construction showing that such codes exist and can be efficient when the size of the leakage family |F | is singly-exponential. However, the rate k/n was at most some small constant (<1/4), even when the family size |F | and the leakage size are small. Here, we take the construction of [16] and give an improved analysis with improved parameters, showing that the rate can
approach 1. In particular, the additive overhead of the code is very close to the leakage amount , which is optimal. Our result and analysis are also related to the "high-moment crooked leftover hash lemma" of [49] , although our construction is somewhat different, relying only on high-independence hash functions rather than permutations. Construction: Let H be a t-wise independent function family consisting of functions h : {0,
Theorem 2: Fix any function family F consisting of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} . With probability 1 − ρ over the choice of a random h ← H, the coding scheme (LREnc h , LRDec h ) is (F , ε)-leakage-resilient as long as:
Proof: Fix a function family F , and consider the quantity ρ defined in Eq. (1) at the top of this page, where Eq. (2) follows by taking a union bound over all f ∈ F and
Define the random variable Y r,α such that (3), and (6) follows from Lemma 1, with K t ≤ 8. Finally, (7) follows from the fact that the theorem's parameters ensure:
Combining the above with (2), we get:
. Therefore we can set:
V. NON-MALLEABLE CODES
We now construct a non-malleable code for any family F of sufficiently small size. We will rely on leakage resilience as an integral part of the analysis.
Construction: Let H 1 be a family of hash functions h 1 : {0, 1} v 1 → {0, 1} k , and H 2 be a family of hash functions h 2 : {0, 1} k+v 1 → {0, 1} v 2 such that H 1 and H 2 are both t-wise independent. For any
= h 2 (r, z) and if this fails, outputs ⊥, else outputs z ⊕ h 1 (r ). Notice that we can think of (r, z) as being a leakage-resilient encoding of x; i.e., (r, z) = LREnc h 1 (x; r ).
Theorem 3: For any function family F , the above construc-
is an (F , ε)-super non-malleable code with probability 1 − ρ over the choice of h 1 , h 2 as long as:
For example, in the above theorem, if we set ρ = ε = 2 −λ for "security parameter" λ, and |F | = 2 s(n) for some polynomial
Therefore the rate of the code k/n is 1 − O(λ + log n)/n, which approaches 1 as n grows relative to λ.
A. Proof of Theorem 3
For a coding scheme (Enc, Dec), we say that c ∈ {0, 1} n is valid if Dec(c) = ⊥. For any function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , we say that c ∈ {0, 1} n is δ-heavy
where the probability is over the randomness of the encoding.
1) Intuition:
The above definition says the following. Take any message x ∈ {0, 1} k , any tampering function f ∈ F , and do the following: choose c ← Enc(x), set c = f (c), and output:
otherwise. Then, with probability 1−τ the output of the above experiment takes on one of the values: {same , ⊥} ∪ H f (δ). Therefore, the output of the above tampering experiment only leaks a bounded amount of information about c; in particular it leaks at most = log(1/δ + 2) bits. Furthermore the "leakage" on c is independent of the choice of the code, up to knowing which codewords are valid and which are δ-heavy. In particular, in our construction, the "leakage" only depends on the choice of h 2 but not on the choice of h 1 . This will allow us to then rely on the fact that LREnc h 1 (x; r ) = (r, h 1 (r )⊕ x) is a leakage-resilient encoding of x to argue that the output of the above experiment is the same for x as for a uniformly random value. We formalize this intuition below.
2) From Bounded-Malleable to Non-Malleable: For any "tampering function" family F consisting of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , any δ > 0, and any h 2 ∈ H 2 we define the "leakage function" family G = G(F , h 2 , δ) which consists of the functions g f : {0,
The functions are defined as follows:
Lastly, if none of the above cases holds, output ⊥. Notice that the notion of "δ-heavy" and the set H f (δ) are completely specified by h 2 and do not depend on h 1 . This is because the distribution
is fully specified by F , h 2 , δ. Also notice that |G| = |F | and that the output length of the functions g f is given by = log(|H f (δ)| + 2) ≤ log(1/δ + 2) .
Lemma 3: Let F be any function family and let
, with size |G| = |F |, is defined above, and the leakage amount is = log(1/δ + 2) . Then
Proof: For any x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and any f ∈ F :
stat
Eq. (8) (F , h 2 , δ) , ε/4)-leakage-resilient with overwhelming probability. Therefore, it remains to show that our construction is (F , δ, τ )-bounded-malleable, which we do below.
3) Analysis of Bounded-Malleable Codes: We now show that the code (Enc h 1 ,h 2 , Dec h 1 ,h 2 ) is bounded-malleable with overwhelming probability. As a very high-level intuition, if a tampering function f can often map valid codewords to other valid codewords (and many different ones), then it must guess the output of h 2 on many different inputs. If the family F is small enough, it is highly improbable that it would contain some such f . For more detailed intuition, we show that the following two properties hold for any message x and any function f with overwhelming probability: (i) there is at most some "small" set of q valid codewords c that we can hit by tampering some encoding of x via f ; (ii) for each such codeword c which is not δ-heavy, the probability of landing in c after tampering an encoding of x cannot be higher than 2δ. This shows that the total probability of tampering an encoding of x and landing in a valid codeword which is not δ-heavy is at most 2qδ, which is small. Property (i) roughly follows by showing that f would need to "predict" the output of h 2 on q different inputs, and property (ii) follows by using "leakage resilience" of h 1 to argue that we cannot distinguish an encoding of x from an encoding of a random message, for which the probability of landing in c is at most δ. 
Assume (h 1 , h 2 ) are any hash functions for which the event BAD does not occur. Then, for every f ∈ F , x ∈ {0, 1} k : (12) where C = Enc h 1 ,h 2 (x; U v 1 ) is a random variable. Eq. (12) holds since (i) given that E 1 does not occur, there are fewer than q values c that are valid and for which Pr[ f (C) = c ∧ C = c ] > 0, and (ii) given that E 2 does not occur, for any c ∈ H f (δ), we also have Pr[
Therefore, if the event BAD does not occur, then the code is (F , δ, τ )-bounded-malleable. This means:
So it suffices to show that Pr
Proof: Fix some message x ∈ {0, 1} k and some function f ∈ F . Assume that the event E {c a 1 , . . . , c a s , c a 1 , . . . , c a 
Therefore, we have the sequence of inequalities shown at the top of this page, where Eq. (13), as shown at the bottom of the page follows from the fact that, even if we condition on any choice of the hash function h 1 which fixes z i = h 1 (r i ) ⊕ x, and any choice of the s values and |{c 1 , . . . , c s , c 1 , . . . , c s }| = 2s, then the probability that h 2 (r i , z i ) = σ i for all i ∈ [s] is at most 2 −sv 2 . Here we use the fact that H 2 is t-wise independent where t ≥ q ≥ 2s. Now, we calculate
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that q = log |F | + k + log(1/ψ) + 1 .
For this proof, we will rely on the leakage resilience property of the code (LREnc h 1 , LRDec h 1 ) as shown 1 In other words, if we take any set of tuples {(c i , c i )} such that all the left components are distinct c i = c j and all the right components are distinct c i = c j , but there may be common values c i = c j , then there is a subset of at least 1/3 of the tuples such that all left and right components in this subset are mutually distinct. in Theorem 2. First, let us write:
since, for any
Notice that we can write
. We will now rely on the leakage resilience of the code (LREnc h 1 , LRDec h 1 ) to bound the above probability by ψ/2. In fact, we show that the above holds even if we take the probability over h 1 only, for a worst-case choice of h 2 . Let us fix some choice of h 2 and define the family G = G(h 2 ) of leakage functions G = {g f,c : {0, 1} k+v 1 → {0, 1} s.t. f ∈ F , c ∈ {0, 1} n } with output size = 1 bits as follows:
1, else output 0. Notice that the size of the family G is 2 n |F | and the family does not depend on the choice of h 1 . Therefore, continuing from inequality (14), we get:
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 by the choice of parameters.
4) Putting It All Together:
Lemma 3 tells us that for any δ > 0 and any function family F :
is of size |G| = |F | and consists of functions with output size = log(1/δ + 2) . Let us set δ := (ε/8)(log |F | + k + log(1/ρ) + 3) −1 . This ensures that the first requirement of Lemma 4 is satisfied with τ = ε/4. We choose t * = O(log |F | + n + log(1/ρ)) such that log(1/δ) ≤ log(1/ε) + log(t * ) + O (1) . Notice that the leakage amount of G is = log(1/δ + 2) ≤ log(1/ε) + log(t * ) + O(1). With v 1 , v 2 as in Theorem 3, we satisfy the remaining requirements of Lemma 4 (bounded-malleable codes) and Theorem 2 (leakage-resilient codes) to ensure that the probabilities (15), (16) are both bounded by ρ/2, which proves our theorem.
VI. NON-MALLEABLE KEY DERIVATION
In this section we introduce a new primitive, which we name non-malleable key derivation. Intuitively a function h is a nonmalleable key-derivation function if h(x) is close to uniform even given the output of h applied to a related input f (x), as long as f (x) = x. Definition 6 (Non-Malleable Key Derivation): Let F be any family of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We say that a function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k is an (F , ε)-nonmalleable key-derivation function if for every f ∈ F we have SD Real h ( f ); Sim h ( f ) ≤ ε where Real h ( f ) and Sim h ( f ) denote the output distributions of the corresponding experiments described in Fig. 1 .
Note that the above definition can be interpreted as a dual version of the definition of non-malleable extractors [15] . 2 The theorem below states that by sampling a function h from a set H of t-wise independent hash functions, we obtain a non-malleable key-derivation function with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 4: Let H be a 2t-wise independent function family consisting of functions h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k and let F be some function family as above. Then with probability 1 − ρ over the choice of a random h ← H, the function h is an (F , ε)-non-malleable key-derivation function as long as: n ≥ 2k + log(1/ε) + log(t) + 3 t > log(|F |) + 2k + log(1/ρ) + 5.
Proof: For any h ∈ H and f ∈ F , define a function h( f (x) ). Fix a function family F . Then:
Fix f, y, y . For every x ∈ {0, 1} n , define a random variable C x over the choice of h ← H, such that
o t h e r w i s e .
Notice that each C x is 0 on expectation. However, the random variables C x are not even pairwise independent. 3 In Section VI-A, we prove the following lemma about the variables C x .
Lemma 5: There exists a partitioning of {0, 1} n into four disjoint subsets {A j } 4 j =1 , such that for any A > 0 and for all j = 1, . . . , 4:
where K t ≤ 8. 3 For example if f (x) = f (x ) and C x = 0 then C x = 0 as well.
Continuing from Eq. (17), we get:
Eq. (18) In particular, the above holds as long as:
A. Proof of Lemma 5
It will be convenient to represent the tampering function f as a graph. In particular, we define a directed graph G = (V, E) with vertices V = {0, 1} n and edges E = {(x, x ) : x = f (x)}. Each vertex has out-degree 1, and the graph may contain self-loops. We choose a random h ← H, and label each vertex x with a value h(x). Each random variable C x depends only on the labels of the vertices x and f (x). As we mentioned, the random variables C x are not independent. However, we show how to partition the variables into 4 sets such that, within each set, the variables are either independent or "as good as independent". First we partition the values x ∈ {0, 1} n into two sets S f (self-loop) and S f (no self-loop) such that x ∈ S f if and only if f (x) = x. We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Let t > 2 be an even integer. Consider the set of random variables {C x } x∈S f . Then for any A > 0,
where K t ≤ 8. Proof: First consider the case when y = same . In this case, for all x ∈ S f , we have that C x = 0 for any choice of h and thus the statement is verified. On the other hand when y = same the variables {C x } x∈S f are t-wise independent. Hence, the statement follows directly from Lemma 1. Now, consider the subgraph G(S f ) induced by S f ⊆ V . In S f , there is no self-loop and each vertex has at most one outgoing edge. 4 We prove the following lemma about G(S f ).
Lemma 7: The graph G(S f ) is 3-colorable.
Proof: We prove the lemma by constructing an algorithm to color G(S f ) with 3 colors (say R, B and W). We recall that, by definition, in graph G(S f ) each vertex has at most one outgoing edge. Without loss of generality we assume that each vertex in the graph has exactly one outgoing edge. It is easy to see that this is the worst-case for graph coloring, as more edges might enforce to use more colors. This fact we exploit heavily in this proof. The algorithm is described as follows:
1) Pick up a vertex randomly and color it by some arbitrary color, say R. 2) Follow the unique outgoing edge to color the next vertex by a different color, say B. 3) Continue to color vertices alternately following unique outgoing edges successively, with the following check at each step. To color a vertex check if its successor vertex is uncolored. If it is, then color the vertex with R or B, whichever appropriate. Otherwise, there may be a situation such that both the predecessor and the successor of a vertex are colored with different colors, which enforces to color that vertex with the third color, namely W. After that, pick up another uncolored vertex randomly and repeat from the beginning of step 3. If no such vertex is left then stop. Note that the algorithm always terminates; this is because whenever we encounter a loop we choose a new vertex from the set of uncolored vertices, and there are only finitely many vertices.
To prove the correctness, we observe the following invariant is maintained throughout. According to the algorithm, once we are done with coloring some vertex v we move to color its unique uncolored successor v . Now we claim that all the other predecessors v of v which are different from v must be uncolored. To see this, we assume by contradiction that there is some v different from v which is colored. Now, since v is the unique successor of v , following the algorithm we must have colored v immediately after we color v . Therefore, assuming v is colored leads to the fact that v is already colored which is a contradiction. So, the only neighbor of v which might be colored is its unique successorv. Note that this may enforce us to color v differently from both its predecessor v and its unique successorv with the third color, which we are allowed to do. We conclude that the algorithm imposes a proper 3-coloring on G(S f ).
By the above lemma we can partition the set S f ⊆ {0, 1} n into three disjoint subsets A 1 , A 2 , A 3 (i.e., the three colors) such that for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and all x, x ∈ A j , f (x) = x . We consider the set of variables {C x } x∈A j . Intuitively, the above partitioning removed some "bad" dependence between variables C x and C f (x) by seeparating them into different subsets. However, even within any set A j , the variables are not t-wise independent. For example if f (x) = f (x ) then C x and C x may be in the same set A j but are correlated. Nevertheless, we prove that the correlation within each set goes in the "right" direction and allows us to bound the sum. In particular, we prove the following lemma about the set of variables {C x } x∈A j ; note that Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 imply Lemma 5 by letting S f = A 4 .
Lemma 8: Let t > 2 be an even integer. Consider the set of random variables {C x } x∈ A j for some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Denote their sum by j = x∈ A j C x . Then for any A > 0 and for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
where K t ≤ 8.
Proof: Fix some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. First consider the case when y = same . In this case, for all x ∈ A j , we have that C x = 0 for any choice of h. Thus, Pr[ j > A] = 0 and the statement of the lemma is verified. For the remaining of this proof we will assume that y = same .
Let |A j | = m for some m ∈ [2 n ], and denote the variables
we can define the corresponding conditional random variable C x i |(h( f (x i )) = y ) as follows: C x 1 , C x 2 , . . . , C x m are not independent. However, since within a set A j there is no pair x, x such that f (x) = x , the only possibility of dependence among the variables arises from the event: f (x) = f (x ). We can further partition the variables in the product
where b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l } and 1 ≤ l ≤ l, such that, in each sub-product b , for all i ∈ S b , f (x a i ) = x b (for some x b ∈ A j ∪ S f , with j = j ). Now, since (i) by definition, dependent variables are within the same sub-product and (ii) the hash function h is 2t-wise independent, the sub-products { b } l b=1 are mutually independent.
Next, we compute the expectation E[ b ]:
The second equality of Eq. (21) follows from the fact that C x = 0 whenever h( f (x)) = y ; the third equality follows from the definition of C a i . We now compute the expectation of the product
, as follows:
. (22) The first equality of Eq. (22) follows from the fact that the sub-products b are mutually independent, the second equality follows from Eq. (21) and the third equality from the t-wise independence of the variables C a i . This concludes the proof of the claim.
B. Optimal Rate of Non-Malleable Key Derivation
We can define the rate of a key-derivation function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k as the ratio k/n. Notice that our construction achieves rate arbitrarily close to 1/2. We claim that this is optimal for non-malleable key derivation. To see this, consider a tampering function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n which is a permutation and never identity:
consisting of 2k random bits. Since all of the randomness in (h(X), h( f (X))) comes from X, this means that X must contain at least 2k bits of randomness, meaning that n > 2k.
VII. A TAMPER-RESILIENT STREAM CIPHER
Throughout this section, we write CD
| for the advantage of a PPT adversary A in distinguishing two random variables X 1 and X 2 (defined over some space X ).
A stream cipher SC takes as input an initial key s 0 ∈ {0, 1} n and is executed in rounds. For i ∈ [q], it computes in the ith round (s i , x i ) = SC(s i−1 ) where x i ∈ {0, 1} v is given to the adversary. We write SC i (s 0 ) = (s i , x i ) to denote the ith output of SC, when run for i rounds with initial key s 0 . We also write (s i , x i ) for the corresponding random variables, generated by sampling s 0 ← {0, 1} n and running the stream cipher on this key.
The standard security requirement says that even given x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , the adversary cannot distinguish between the next block x i and a uniform random sample u ← U v .
We strengthen this security requirement and allow the adversary to tamper additionally with the secret state of SC. Of course, if an adversary can apply an arbitrary function f i to the state, he may just overwrite it with a known key, which clearly contradicts the pseudorandomness of x i+1 . Notice that such an "overwriting" makes the cipher useless and does not help the adversary to, e.g., decrypt ciphertexts that were encrypted with SC(s 0 ). To model tamper resilience of SC we consider an adversary A that obtains both the correctly evaluated outputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x i ) of SC(s 0 ) and the faulty outputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x i ) where (s i+1 , x i+1 ) = SC( f i+1 (s i )) . We say that SC is secure against tampering attacks if even given the outputs (x, x ) the random variable x i+1 is computationally close to uniform.
More formally, consider the following experiment (running with a PPT adversary A and a family of functions F ) and denote its output by view A,F (q): 1) Sample s 0 ← U n and let s 0 := s 0 .
2) The adversary repeats the following for each i ∈ [q]: a) Compute untampered output:
3) The output of the experiment is defined as
where view A,F (q) is defined as above, x q+1 := SC q (s 0 ), and SC q denotes q executions of the stream cipher. Construction: Recall that a pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a function prg : {0, 1} k 1 → {0, 1} k 2 ; we say that prg is ε-secure if for all PPT adversaries A we have
Consider the following construction of a stream cipher SC h,prg , based on a PRG prg : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n+v and a nonmalleable key-derivation function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k (see also Fig. 2 on the next page) . At the beginning a description of the function h and of the pseudorandom generator prg are output as public parameters. Then a key s 0 ← {0, 1} n is sampled uniformly at random and for each i ∈ [q] we define the output of the stream cipher at round i as
Theorem 5: Assume that prg is an ε prg -secure pseudorandom generator and that h is an (F , ε)-non-malleable key-derivation function. Then the stream cipher SC h,prg defined above is continuously (F , ε )-tamper-resilient, where ε ≤ (2q + 1)ε + 2qε prg .
Proof: Consider the distribution D f,h over {0, 1} k ∪ same , which samples s ← U n and outputs same if f (s) = s and h( f (s)) otherwise.
Before giving the formal proof, let us discuss some intuition. We show the desired computational indistinguishability through several intermediate hybrid games. Notice that the Step 2b in the definition). In the i -th hybrid we replace the i -th output of h in the untampered chain, by a uniform random value. In the tampered chain, if the adversary is yet to tamper, then we replace the output of h with a random sample from the distribution D f i ,h . In case D f i ,h returns some value which is not same , i.e. the adversary tampered, then we stop sampling further and continue to simulate the output from that point on using the last sampled value. Nonmalleability of the key-derivation function h guarantees that, once the adversary tampers, the modified value reveals almost no information about the "extracted" key. Notice that, if before entering the i -th round the adversary had already tampered, then there is no difference between the i -th and (i + 1)-th hybrids in the tampered chain. We now proceed with the formal proof.
Define the following hybrid games for all i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and all b ∈ {0, 1}. and give x j to A.
; thus our goal is to bound CD A Game 0 (0); Game 0 (1) . By using the triangle inequality, we write:
Eq. (23) Let us now compare the output distribution of Game q and Game q . Again, the only difference is in the challenge phase: in the former the input of prg is computed as h(s q ) for some uniformly random s q ← U n , whereas in the latter the input of prg is sampled uniformly as κ q+1 ← U k . Now the fact that h is non-malleable clearly implies that the output of h on a random input is close to uniform. 6 This shows that CD A Game q ; Game q ≤ ε.
Combining the above arguments, we conclude from A. In case the execution is still in normal mode, set s i := s i . In the next step, irrespective of the mode, compute (x j , s j ) ← prg(h( f j (s j −1 ))) and give x j to A.
Step 4 is defined exactly as in Game i (b). We notice that the only difference between Game i (b) and Game i (b) is in Step 3: in the i -th round the last output of prg (i.e., s i ) is replaced by a uniformly random value in the latter. Note that in case the execution has already entered the overwritten mode, this change does not affect the tampered output; on the other hand, in case the execution is still in normal mode, then in the tampered output the i -th output of prg is replaced by the above uniform value s i . Thus, clearly,
Let us now compare the output distribution of Game i (b) and Game i+1 (b) . Again the only differences are as follows:
• Regarding the untampered output, the (i + 1)-th output of h is replaced by a uniformly random value κ i+1 in Game i+1 (b) whereas in Game i (b) it is computed as h(s i ) for some uniform s i .
• Regarding the tampered output, there is no difference in case the execution has already entered the overwritten mode. In case the execution is still normal mode, then
is not same , then the output will be computed by running prg on κ i+1 ; else, the output is just copied from the untampered output. We observe that Game i (b) can be computed as a deterministic function of Real h ( f i+1 ) and Game i+1 (b) as a deterministic function of Sim h ( f i+1 ) (cf. Fig. 1 ). This shows that
Combining the above arguments, we conclude that for any b ∈ {0, 1} and all i ∈ [q − 1]
as desired.
Claim 6:
For all values b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
The statement can be shown in a similar way as in the proof of Claim 5, with the only difference that in this case the first input to h is a uniformly random value s 0 (rather that some "pseudorandom" value), and thus the modified game Game 0 (b) collapses to Game 0 (b).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that for any family of tampering functions F of size |F | ≤ 2 s , there exist efficient non-malleable codes and key derivation functions that protect against all f ∈ F . Our constructions are secure in the information-theoretic setting, are simple and efficient, and have asymptotically optimal rate.
Our results have direct applications to the protection of cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks. In particular, we have explored the usefulness of non-malleable keyderivation for constructing the first tamper-resilient stream cipher.
APPENDIX ONE-TIME TAMPER SIMULATABILITY
Similarly to [1] , we show that a non-malleable key-derivation function can be used to protect any functionality against tampering attacks. We consider two main differences with respect to the setting considered in [1] : (i) the original functionality is stateless and works with a uniformly chosen state; (ii) the attacker can only tamper once.
A stateless functionality G, κ consists of a public (possibly randomized) function G : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} u → {0, 1} v and a secret initial state κ ∈ {0, 1} k . Whenever the state κ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , we say that the functionality is regular. The main idea is to transform G, κ into some "hardened" functionality G h , s via a non-malleable keyderivation function h. Definition 8 (Hardened Functionality): Let h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k be a function. Let G : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} u → {0, 1} v be any stateless, regular functionality with k-bit state. We define the hardened functionality G h : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} u → {0, 1} v to be the functionality that takes as input (s, x) ∈ {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} u and outputs y ← G (h(s), x) .
Security of G h is defined via the comparison of a real and an ideal experiment. The real experiment features an adversary A interacting with G h ; the adversary is allowed to honestly run the functionality on any chosen input, but also to tamper with the original state and interact with the modified functionality. The ideal experiment features a simulator S; the simulator is given black-box access to the original functionality G and to the adversary A, but is not allowed any tampering query. The two experiments are formally described below.
Experiment Real
A,F : A value s ← {0, 1} n is chosen uniformly at random. Then A can issue the following commands (in any order):
• Eval, x : In response to an evaluation query, return y ← G(h(s), x). This command can be run a polynomial number of times.
• Tamper, f : Upon input f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , with f ∈ F , replace s by f (s). This command can be run a single time. The output of the experiment is defined as
: A value κ ← {0, 1} k is chosen uniformly at random. The simulator is given black-box access to the functionality G(κ, ·) and the adversary A. The output of the experiment is defined as
where (x j , y j ) are the input/output tuples simulated by S.
Definition 9 (One-Time Tamper Simulatability): Let h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k be a function and consider a stateless, regular functionality G. Denote with G h the hardened functionality corresponding to G. We say that h is one-time (F , ε)-tamper simulatable for G, if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a PPT simulator S such that for any initial state κ, The theorem below states that whenever h is a nonmalleable key-derivation function, then it is also one-time tamper simulatable.
Theorem 6 Consider a stateless, regular functionality G. Let h be an (F , ε)-non-malleable key-derivation function, then h is one-time (F , ε)-tamper simulatable for G.
Proof: Define the following distribution D f,h over {0, 1} k ∪ same (which is efficiently samplable given blackbox access to functions f and h): Sample s ← {0, 1} n and define κ = same if f (s) = s and κ = h( f (s)) otherwise. The simulator S, having black-box access to the adversary A and the original functionality G, κ , will use D f,h to answer A's tampering query.
At the beginning, S runs A and then it works in one of two modes defined below (starting with the "normal mode"):
1) Normal mode. While A continues issuing queries, answer as follows:
• Upon input Eval, x , forward x to G(κ, ·) and return the output y back to A.
• Upon input Tamper, f , sample κ ← D f,h .
Hence, -In case κ = same , stay in the current mode.
-In case κ = same , go to the "overwritten mode" defined below with state κ. 2) Overwritten mode. Given state κ simulate all further evaluation queries by running G( κ, ·). 3) Output whatever A does.
We argue that Real To argue indistinguishability of the simulation, we observe that the real experiment and the ideal experiment are identical after the simulator enters in overwritten mode. To conclude the proof, we show that they are also indistinguishable for each round up to and including the round in which the simulator enters in overwritten mode. Without loss of generality, assume that A applies the tampering function f at round q, for some q ∈ N. Denote with Real 
Thus,
SD(Real
